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In models of search on the job (e.g. Kenneth Bur-
dett and Dale Mortensen 1998, Burdett and Melvyn
Coles 2003, Alain Delacroix and Shouyong Shi
2006), employed and unemployed workers search the
labor market for job openings. Workers who are un-
employed are willing to accept any job that makes
them better off than enjoying leisure and continuing
to search. Workers who are employed are willing to
accept any job that offers them more than their current
job does. On the other side of the market, ﬁrms are
indifferent between opening jobs that offer different
wages, as ﬁrms that offer higher wages can ﬁll their
jobs faster and retain their workers for a longer period
of time. The extent of search frictions determines how
quickly workers move up in the wage-offer distribu-
tion and how the wage-offer distribution itself looks
like. Overall, models of search on the job provide
an equilibrium theory of workers’ transitions between
employment, unemployment and across employers,
and, simultaneously, a theory of wage inequality. Be-
cause of these properties, models of search on the job
are a useful tool for studying the labor market.
Under the standard assumption of random search,
thesemodelsaredifﬁculttosolveoutsideofthesteady
state because agents need to forecast the evolution of
the inﬁnite-dimensional wage distribution in order to
solve their individual problems. For example, ﬁrms
need to forecast the evolution of the wage distribu-
tion in order to compute the probability of ﬁlling a
vacancy. Similarly, workers need to compute the evo-
lution of the wage distribution in order to compare the
value of a particular job offer with the value of their
current employment position. Because of this tech-
nical property, models of random search on the job
are difﬁcult to use for studying the aggregate dynam-
ics of the labor market. For example, these models are
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difﬁcult to use for studying the response of unemploy-
ment, vacancies and wages to aggregate productivity
shocks, or for studying the welfare effects of a change
in labor market policies.
However, when the standard assumption of random
search is replaced with the assumption of directed
search, we (in Guido Menzio and Shi 2009, and Men-
zio and Shi forthcoming) show that models of search
on the job are easy to solve even outside of the steady
state and, hence, can be used for studying the aggre-
gatedynamicsof the labor market. Speciﬁcally, build-
ing on Shi (2009), we develop a general model of di-
rected search on the job, which allows for aggregate
shocks, idiosyncratic shocks, and different speciﬁca-
tions of the contractual environment. For this model,
we formally establish existence of an equilibrium in
which agents do not need to forecast the evolution of
the wage distribution in order to solve their individ-
ual problems. Instead, agents only need to forecast
the evolution of the exogenous aggregate shocks. We
refer to this equilibrium as a Block Recursive Equi-
librium (BRE). Solving for the BRE of our model is
as easy as solving the equilibrium of a representative-
agent model, in and out of the steady-state. More-
over, the BRE of our model preserves all the desirable
properties of traditional models of search on the job
regarding workers’ transitions and wage inequality.
In this paper, we present our model of directed
search on the job. We outline the proof of existence of
a BRE. We explain why a BRE does exist under the
assumption of directed search and why it does not un-
dertheassumptionofrandomsearch. Finally, we gen-
eralize existence of a BRE to a version of the model
in which workers are allowed to be ex-ante heteroge-
neous with respect to some observable characteristics
such as education and skill.
I. Model
We consider an economy populated by a contin-
uum of workers with measure 1, and by a continuum
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of ﬁrms with positive measure. Each worker is en-
dowed with an indivisible unit of labor. Each worker
maximizes the expected sum of periodical utilities 3∞
t=0 βtυ(ct),w h e r eβ is the discount factor and υ
is the periodical utility function with υ  ∈ [υ ,υ ],
υ  > 0, and υ   ≤ 0. Each ﬁrm operates a con-
stant return to scale technology that turns 1 unit of
labor into y + z units of output. The ﬁrst compo-
nent of productivity, y,i sc o m m o nt oa l lﬁrms, and
its value lies in the set Y ={ y1, y2,..., yN(y)},w h e r e
y1 < y2 < ...yN(y) The second component of pro-
ductivity, z,i ss p e c i ﬁct oaﬁrm-worker pair, and its
value lies in the set Z ={ z1,z2,...,zN(z)},w h e r e
z1 < z2 < ... < zN(z).E a c h ﬁrm maximizes the
expected sum of periodical proﬁts discounted at the
factor β.
The labor market is organized in a continuum of
submarkets indexed by the expected lifetime utility
x that the ﬁrms offer to the workers, x ∈ [x,x] =
X,w i t hx <υ ( b)/(1 − β) and x >υ ( yN(y) +
zN(z))/(1−β).S p e c i ﬁcally, whenever a ﬁrm meets a
worker in submarket x,t h eﬁrm offers the worker an
employment contract that gives him the expected life-
time utility x. In submarket x, the ratio of the number
of vacancies created by ﬁrms to the number of work-
ers looking for jobs is given by the tightness θ(x) ≥ 0
which is determined in equilibrium.
At the beginning of each period, the state of the
economy can be summarized by the triple (y,u,g) =
ψ.T h eﬁrst element of ψ is the aggregate component
of productivity. The second element is the measure of
unemployed workers, u ∈ [0,1]. The third element is
a function g : X × Z → [0,1], with g(V,z) denoting
the measure of workers who are employed at jobs that
give them the lifetime utility ˜ V ≤ V and that have an
idiosyncratic component of productivity ˜ z ≤ z.
Each period is divided into four stages: separation,
search, matching and production. At the separation
stage, an employed worker is forced to move into un-
employment with probability δ ∈ (0,1]. Also, at the
separation stage, an employed worker has the option
tovoluntarilymoveintounemployment. At thesearch
stage, a worker (employed or unemployed) chooses in
which submarket to look for a job, and a ﬁrm chooses
how many vacancies to create and where to locate
them. The cost of maintaining a vacancy is k > 0.
Both workers and ﬁrms take θ(x) parametrically.
At the matching stage, the workers and the vacan-
cies in submarket x come together through a frictional
matching process. In particular, a worker meets a va-
cancy with probability p(θ(x)),w h e r ep is a strictly
increasing and concave function such that p(0) = 0
and p (0)>0. Similarly, a vacancy meets a worker
withprobabilityq(θ(x)),w h e r eq isastrictlydecreas-
ing and convex function such that q(θ) = p(θ)/θ,
q(0) = 1, q (0)<0, and p(q−1(.)) concave. When
a vacancy and a worker meet, the ﬁrm that owns the
vacancy offers to the worker an employment contract
that gives him the lifetime utility x. If the worker re-
jects the offer, he returns to his previous employment
position. If the worker accepts the offer, the two par-
ties form a new match with idiosyncratic productivity
z0.
At the production stage, an unemployed worker
produces and consumes b > 0 units of output. A
worker employed at a job z produces y + z units of
output and consumes w of them, where w is speci-
ﬁed by the worker’s labor contract. At the end of the
production stage, Nature draws next period’s aggre-
gate component of productivity, ˆ y, from the probabil-
ity distribution  y(ˆ y|y), and next period’s idiosyn-
cratic component of productivity, ˆ z, from the distrib-
ution  z(ˆ z|z). The draws of the idiosyncratic compo-
nent of productivity are independent across matches.
We consider two alternative contractual environ-
ments. In the “dynamic contracts” environment, a
ﬁrm commits to an employment contract thatspeciﬁes
the worker’s wage as a function of the history of real-
izations of the idiosyncratic productivity of the match,
z, the history of realizations of the aggregate state of
the economy, ψ, and the history of realizations of a
lottery that is drawn at the beginning of every pro-
duction stage. This environment generalizes the con-
tractual environment considered by Burdett and Coles
(2003) and Shi (2009) to an economy with stochastic
productivity. In the “ﬁxed-wage contracts” environ-
ment, a ﬁrm commits to a wage that remains constant
throughout the entire duration of the employment re-
lationship. This constant wage is allowed to depend
only on the outcome of a lottery that is drawn at the
beginning of the employment relationship. This en-
vironment is similar to the one considered by Burdett
and Mortensen (1998).
Notice that, in general, the contracting problem of
the ﬁrm is a complicated sequence problem in which
the history upon which wages are contingent grows to
inﬁnity over time. However, following the literature
on dynamic contracts, we can rewrite this problem re-
cursively by using the worker’s lifetime utility as an
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II. Block Recursive Equilibrium
We denote as U(y) the lifetime utility of a worker
who is unemployed, given that the aggregate compo-
nent of productivity is y.W ed e n o t ea sJ(V, y,z) the
proﬁts of a ﬁrm that employs a worker, given that the
employment contract is worth the lifetime utility V
to the worker, and the idiosyncratic component of the
ﬁrm-worker match is z. The value functions U and J
are measured at the production stage. We denote as
R(V, y) the lifetime utility of a worker at the search
stage, given that the worker’s current employment po-
sition is worth V. W ed e n o t ea sθ(x, y) the equilib-
rium tightness of submarket x. Finally, we denote
with  ψ( ˆ ψ|ψ)the transition probability function for
the aggregate state of the economy ψ.
Now, we are in the position to deﬁn eaB R Ef o r
the environment with dynamic contracts. The reader
can ﬁnd the deﬁnition of a BRE for the environment
with ﬁxed-wage contracts in Menzio and Shi (forth-
coming).
DEFINITION 1: A BRE is a list of value and policy
functions (θ, R,m,U, J,c) together with a transition
probability function  ψ. These functions satisfy the
following conditions:
(i) For all (V,ψ)∈ X ×  ,
R(V, y) = V + max
x∈X
{p(θ(x, y))(x − V)},
and m is the associated policy function;
(ii) For all ψ ∈  ,
U(y) = υ(b) + βER(U(ˆ y), ˆ y);
(iii) For all (V,ψ,z) ∈ X ×   × Z,
J(V, y,z) = max
w, ˆ V∈X
y + z − w
+βE
v
(1 − d(ˆ y, ˆ z))×
(1 −˜ p(ˆ y, ˆ z))J( ˆ V(ˆ y, ˆ z), ˆ y, ˆ z)
w
,
subject to the constraints
V = υ(w)+ βE
v
d(ˆ y, ˆ z)R(U(ˆ y), ˆ y)
+(1 − d(ˆ y, ˆ z)) ˆ V(ˆ y, ˆ z)
w
,
d(ˆ y, ˆ z) ={ 1 if U(y)>V(y,z), δ else},
where ˜ p(ˆ y, ˆ z) ≡ p(θ(m( ˆ V(ˆ y, ˆ z)), ˆ y)) and c is the as-
sociated policy function;
(iv) For all (x,ψ)∈ X ×  ,
k ≥ q(θ(x, y))J(x, y,z0)
and θ(x, y) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness;
(v)Forallψ ∈  ,  ψ isconsistentwiththetransition
probability of the exogenous variables, y and z, and
with the policy functions m and c.
Conditions (i)-(v) are straightforward to interpret.
Condition (i) insures that, given the tightness of each
submarket x, the worker chooses where to apply for
a job to maximize his lifetime utility. Condition (iii)
insures that, given the optimal search strategy of the
worker, the ﬁrm chooses the employment contract to
maximize its proﬁts and to provide the worker with
the promised lifetime utility V. Condition (iv) insures
that the number of vacancies created in each submar-
ket x maximizes the proﬁts of the ﬁrm. Finally, con-
dition (v) insures that the law of motion for the aggre-
gate state of the economy is consistent with the sto-
chastic process for productivity and the agents’ policy
functions. Overall, conditions (i)-(v) insure that, in
a BRE just like in a standard recursive equilibrium,
the choices of each agent are optimal given the other
agents’ choices.
However, unlike in a standard recursive equilib-
rium, in a BRE the agents’ value and policy functions
(θ, R,m,U, J,c)dependonthe aggregate stateof the
economy only through the aggregate component of
productivity, y, and not throughthe whole distribution
of workers across different employment states, (u,g).
Intuitively, this means that in a BRE agents do not
need to forecast the evolution of the entire distribu-
tion of workers to solve their problem, but only the
evolution of their individual state and of the aggre-
gate component of productivity. Formally, this means
that, in order to solve for a BRE, one needs to solve a
system of functional equations in which the unknown
functions depend on three real numbers (the individ-
ual state variables, V and z, and the driving force of
aggregate ￿ uctuations, y) and not on an entire func-
tion (the distribution of workers across employment
states). Solving such a system of functional equation
is as easy as solving the equilibrium of a represen-
tative agent model. We refer to the equilibrium as a
Block Recursive Equilibrium because it is a recursive
equilibrium and the block of equilibrium conditions
that describe the agents’ value and policy functions
c a nb es o l v e db e f o r eh a v i n gs o l v e dt h el a wo fm o t i o n
of the aggregate state of the economy.4 PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MONTH YEAR
III. Existence
W h i l ew ec a nd e ﬁne a Block Recursive Equilib-
rium for any model of search on the job, there is no
reason to believe that such an equilibrium would gen-
erally exist. In fact, for models of random search on
the job, it is easy to establish that no equilibrium is
block recursive. However, for our model of directed
search on the job, we can establish the following re-
sult.
THEOREM 2: A Block Recursive Equilibrium ex-
ists.
The proof of Theorem 2 is in Menzio and Shi
(forthcoming). Here, we present a sketch of the proof.
Let J denote the set of bounded and continuous proﬁt
functions that depend on the aggregate state of the
economy, ψ, only through the aggregate component
of productivity, y, and not through the distribution of
workers across employment states, (u,g).W et a k ea n
arbitrary proﬁtf u n c t i o nJ from the set J.G i v e nJ,
the market tightness function, θ, that solves the equi-
librium condition (iv) depends on ψ only though y
and not through (u,g). Intuitively, since the value
to a ﬁrm of ﬁl l i n gav a c a n c yi ns u b m a r k e tx does
not depend on the distribution of workers across em-
ployment states and the cost of creating a vacancy is
constant, the probability that a ﬁrm ﬁlls a vacancy in
submarket x, and hence the tightness of submarket x,
must be independent of (u,g).
Given θ, the search value function, R, that solves
the equilibrium condition (i) depends on ψ only
through y. Intuitively, R does not depend on (u,g)
because neither the probability that a worker meets a
vacancy in submarket x nor the beneﬁtt oaw o r k e ro f
m e e t i n gav a c a n c yi ns u b m a r k e tx depends on the dis-
tribution of workers across employment states. Given
R, the unemployment value function, U,t h a ts o l v e s
the equilibrium condition (ii) depends only on ψ only
through y. Intuitively, U does not depend on (u,g)
because neither the output of an unemployed worker
nor his return to search depends on the distribution of
workers across employment states.
After inserting J, θ, R and U into the RHS of the
equilibrium condition (iii), we obtain an update for
the proﬁtf u n c t i o n ,TJ.T h e p r o ﬁtf u n c t i o nTJ de-
pends on ψ only through y. Intuitively, TJdoes not
depend on (u,g), because the output of the match in
the current period, the probability that the match sur-
vives until the next production stage, and the value to
the ﬁrm of the match at the next production stage are
all independent of the distribution of workers. Hence,
the equilibrium operator T maps the set of proﬁtf u n c -
tions J into itself. Moreover, the operator T satisﬁes
the assumptions of Schauder’s ﬁxed point theorem,
and, hence, there exists a J∗ ∈ J such that J∗ =
TJ∗.G i v e n J∗, we construct the value and policy
functions θ∗, R∗, m∗, U∗ as described above. Taken
together, the functions (θ∗, R∗,m∗,U∗, J∗,c∗) sat-
isfy the equilibrium conditions (i)-(iv) and depend on
the aggregate state of the economy ψ only through y.
Hence, they constitute a BRE.
Directed search is necessary for existence of a
BRE. To seethisnecessity clearly, supposethatsearch
is random, instead. Then the equilibrium condition
(iv) is replaced by
(1) k ≥ max
x∈X
q(θ(ψ))I(x,ψ) J(x,ψ,z0),
and θ(ψ) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness. The
term on the LHS of (1) is the cost of creating a va-
cancy. The expression on the RHS of (1) is the maxi-
mized beneﬁt of creating a vacancy. The ﬁrst term on
the RHS is the probability that a ﬁrm meets a worker.
The second term denotes the probability that a ran-
domly selected worker is willing to accept an employ-
ment contract that offers him the value x.T h e t h i r d
term is the value to a ﬁrm of having an employee to
whom it has promised the value x. Notice that the
probability that a randomly selected worker is willing
to accept a contract that offers x depends on the dis-
tribution of workers across employment states. That
is, I(x,ψ) depends on ψ not only through y,b u ta l s o
through (u,g). In turn, this implies that the equilib-
riumcondition(1)holdsonlyifthedistributionaffects
also the market tightness θ or the proﬁtf u n c t i o nJ.I n
either case, the equilibrium fails to be block recursive.
In contrast, directed search eliminates the depen-
dence of the acceptance probabilityon the distribution
of workers because a worker always accepts a job that
he chooses to search for. That is, I(x,ψ) = 1. In
turn, I(x,ψ) = 1 guarantees that, if the proﬁtf u n c -
tion J does not depend on the distribution of workers,
neither do θ, R, m, U, c and the updated proﬁtf u n c -
tion TJ.
IV. Ex-ante Heterogeneous Workers
For some empirical applications, it might be neces-
sary to use a version of the model in which workers
are ex-ante heterogeneous in some observable charac-
teristics such as education or skill. In this section, weVOL. VOL NO. ISSUE DIRECTED SEARCH ON THE JOB 5
establish existence of a BRE for such a version of the
model.
We consider an economy populated by N types of
workers. Speciﬁcally, there is a continuum of work-
ers of type si with measure πi, i = 1,2,...,N,w h e r e
s1 < s2 <. . .<sN and
3N
i=1 πi = 1. A worker’s
type affects his labor productivity. Speciﬁcally, a
worker of type si produces y + z + si units of out-
put when employed in a match with idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity z. In this economy, the labor market is or-
ganized in a continuum of submarkets indexed by the
vector x ∈ XN. In submarket x, ﬁrms offer the ex-
pected lifetime utility xi to workers of type si,w h e r e
xi denotes the i-th component of x.I ns u b m a r k e tx,
the ratio of the number of vacancies created by ﬁrms
to the number of workers looking for jobs is given by
θ(x) ≥ 0, and the distribution of workers across types
is given by φ(x).
We denote as U(si, y), R(si,V, y) and m(si,V, y)
the value and policy functions of a worker of type
si,a n dw i t hm j(si,V, y) the j-th component of
m(si,V, y). Similarly, we denote as J(si,V,z, y)
and c(si,V,z, y) the value and policy function of a
ﬁrm that employs a worker of type si.
THEOREM 3: Let (θi, Ri,mi,Ui, Ji,ci) be a
BRE of the economy with ex-ante homogeneous work-
ers of type si. The economy with ex-ante hetero-
geneous workers admits a BRE with the following
properties for i = 1,2,..., N: (i) For all (V, y) ∈
X × Y, R(si,V, y) = Ri(V, y) and mi(si,V, y) =
mi(V, y); (ii) For all y ∈ Y, U(si, y) = Ui(y);
(iii) For all (V,z, y) ∈ X × Z × Y, J(si,V,z, y) =
Ji(V,z, y) and c(si,V,z, y) = ci(V,z, y);( i v )F o r
all (V, y) ∈ X × Y,θ(m(si,V, y)) = θi(mi(V, y)).
The proof of Theorem 3 is in the online Appen-
dix. The theorem states that there exists a BRE
of the economy with ex-ante heterogeneous workers
that is given by the stratiﬁcation of the BRE of the
N economies with ex-ante homogeneous workers of
type si, i = 1,2,..., N. Speciﬁcally, in the BRE of
the economy with ex-ante heterogeneous workers, the
value and policy functions of a worker of type si are
the same as in the BRE of an economy in which all
workers are of type si. Similarly, the value and policy
functions of a ﬁrm that employs a worker of type si
are the same as in the BRE of the economy with ho-
mogeneous workers of type si. Practically, Theorem
3 implies that, in order to solve for the BRE of the
economy with ex-ante heterogeneity, it is sufﬁcient to
solve for the BRE of the N economies with ex-ante
identical workers.
Let us give some intuition for Theorem 3. In the
economy with ex-ante heterogeneous workers, the la-
bor market is endogenously segmented by worker’s
type, in the sense that any active submarket is visited
exclusively by one type of worker. Given that the la-
bor market is segmented, it is easy to understand why
there exists a BRE given by the stratiﬁcation of the
BRE of the N economies with ex-ante homogeneous
workers. Now, to understand why the labor market
is segmented, consider the following thought experi-
ment. Suppose that submarket x = (x1,x2) is visited
by workers of type s1 and s2. Without loss in gener-
ality, suppose that the proﬁts of the ﬁrm are greater if
it ﬁl l sav a c a n c yi ns u b m a r k e tx with a worker of type
s1 rather than s2. Then, in submarket x  = (x1,x),
the expected proﬁts of the ﬁrm from ﬁlling a vacancy
are greater than in submarket x, because no worker
of type s2 searches in x . Hence, the probability that a
ﬁrmﬁllsavacancymustbelowerinsubmarketx  than
in submarket x and, in turn, θ(x ) must be greater than
θ(x).B u ti fθ(x )isgreaterthanθ(x), aworkeroftype
s1 is better off applying for a job in submarket x  than
in x. This contradicts the conjecture that submarket x
is visited by both types of workers.
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Proof of Theorem 3
In order to keep the exposition as simple as possible, we prove the theorem for N = 2. The proof for N ≥ 3
is similar.
Theorem 2 guarantees that there exists at least one BRE for the economy with ex-ante homogeneous workers
of type si, i = 1,2. Let (θi, Ri,mi,Ui, Ji,ci) be any BRE for the economy with ex-ante homogeneous types
of type si.L e t(θ,φ, R,m,U, J,c) denote a candidate BRE for the economy with ex-ante heterogeneous agents.
F i xa na r b i t r a r yy ∈ Y and, without loss in generality, suppose that θ1(x, y) ≥ θ2(x, y). Now, choose the
market tightness function, θ, and the distribution of applicants, φ,a sf o l l o w s . F o ra l l(x1,x2) ∈ X × (x,x],
let θ(x1,x2) = min{θ1(x1),θ2(x2)} and let φ(x1,x2) = (1,0) if θ1(x1)<θ 2(x2) and φ(x1,x2) = (0,1)
if θ1(x1)>θ 2(x2).F o r a l lx1 ∈ X,l e tθ(x1,x) = θ1(x1) and φ(x1,x) = (1,0).T h a t i s ,f o rx2 > x,w e
set the tightness of submarket (x1,x2) to the minimum between the tightness of submarket x1 in an economy
with ex-ante homogeneous workers of type 1, and the tightness of submarket x2 in an economy with ex-ante
homogeneous workers of type 2. For x2 = x, we set the tightness of submarket (x1,x2) to be the tightness
of submarket x1 in an economy with ex-ante heomogeneous workers of type 1. Notice that, in the previous
e x p r e s s i o n s ,w eh a v eo m i t t e dt h ed ependence of various functions on y. We shall do the same in the remainder
of the proof.
Next, choose the search value function, R, the search policy function, m, the proﬁtf u n c t i o n ,J,a n dt h e
unemployment value function, U,a sf o l l o w s . F o ra l lV ∈ X and i = 1,2, let R(si,V) = Ri(V).F o r a l l
V ∈ X,l e tm(s1,V) = (m1(V), x) and m(s2,V) = (x,m2(V)).F o r a l l (V,z) ∈ X × Z and i = 1,2, let
J(si,V,z) = Ji(V,z) and c(si,V,z) = ci(V,z).F o ri = 1,2, let U(si, y) = Ui(y). In words, the lifetime
utility of worker si in an economy with ex-ante heterogeneous workers is set equal to the lifetime utility of
a worker in an economy with ex-ante homogeneous workers of type si. Similarly, the proﬁts of a ﬁrm from
employing a worker si in an economy with ex-ante heterogeneous workers are equal to the proﬁts of a ﬁrm in an
economy with ex-ante homogeneous workers of type si.
Now, we verify that (θ,φ, R,m,U, J,c) satisﬁes the equilibrium conditions (i)-(iv) and, hence, it is a BRE
for the economy with ex-ante heteorogeneous workers. First, we verify that (θ,φ, R,m,U, J,c) satisﬁes the
equilibrium condition (iv). Consider a submarket (x1,x2) ∈ X2 such that either θ1(x1) ≤ θ2(x2) or x2 = x.I n
this case, we have
(2) q(θ(x1,x2))
32
i=1 φi(x1,x2)J(si,xi,z0) = q(θ1(x1))J1(x1,z0) ≤ k,
θ(x1,x2) = θ1(x1) ≥ 0,
with complementary slackness. The ﬁrst line in (2) denotes as φi(x1,x2) the i-th component of the vector
φ(x1,x2) and makes use of the equations φ(x1,x2) = (1,0), J(si,xi,z0) = Ji(xi,z0), the second line makes
use of the equation θ(x1,x2) = θ1(x1), and both lines use the fact that (θ1, R1,m1,U1, J1,c1) is a BRE. The
inequalities in (2) imply that the equilibrium condition (iv) is satisﬁed for all (x1,x2) ∈ X2 such that either
θ1(x1) ≤ θ2(x2) or x2 = x. Using a similar argument, we can prove that the equilibrium condition (iv) is
satisﬁed for all other submarkets.
Next, we verify that (θ,φ, R,m,U, J,c) satisﬁes the equilibrium condition (i). Consider an arbitrary x1 ∈ X.
For all x2 ∈ (x,x], the tightness of submarket (x1,x2) is θ(x1,x2) ≤ min{θ1(x1),θ2(x2)}.F o rx2 = x,t h e
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where the third line makes use of the fact that (θ1, R1,m1,U1, J1,c1) is a BRE. Moreover, we have that
(4) p(θ(m(s1,V)))(m1(s1,V) − V) = p(θ1(m1(V)))(m1(V) − V),
where m1(s1,V) denotes the ﬁrst component of the vector m(s1,V). Taken together, equations (3) and (4) imply
that the equilibrium condition (i) is satisﬁed for all V ∈ X and i = 1. Using a similar argument, we can prove
that the equilibrium condition (i) is satisﬁed also for i = 2. Moreover, notice that the distribution of applicants φ
across types is consistent with the worker’s equilibrium search strategy m.
Finally, it is straightforward to verify that (θ,φ, R,m,U, J,c) satisﬁes the equilibrium conditions (ii) and
(iii). Hence, (θ,φ, R,m,U, J,c) is a BRE for the economy with ex-ante heterogeneous agents.